Reaching out in the darkness: The changing nature of U.S. policy toward Taiwan
In this article I examine recent adjustments in U.S. policy toward the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan). I outline the basic framework of U.S. policy and explain how and why Washington is adopting a more balanced approach in its relationship with Taipei. I suggest that the United States should continue the review of U.S.-Taiwan relations initiated by the Clinton administration. Modifications in policy are a step in the right direction. But other subtle changes also are in order.
I. Basic Framework of U.S, Policy
During the 1950s and 1960s, the United States maintained a firm alliance with the ROC and poured massive amounts of economic aid and military equipment into Taiwan. In the 1970s, however, Washington sought to enlist Beijing`s strategic cooperation in a global drive to contain Soviet expansionism. In order to secure this support (and normalize relations with China), Washington severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan. During the post-normalization period, American policy toward Taiwan was guided by the TaiwanRelations Act (TRA) and three communiques. Together, these documents constitute "the basic framework" for U.S. policy towardboth Chinese governments.(1) However, there were numerous points of disagreement between the TRA on the one hand and the communiques on the other. Some said this created ambiguity and that there were two U.S. China policies: one coming from the TRA (supported by Congress) and another from the communiques (supported by the White House and Department of State).
The Taiwan Relations Act and the Communiques
On 15 December 1978, the United States announced, effective 1 January 1979, the establishment of full diplomatic relations with the People`s Republic of China (PRC). To achieve normalization, Washington acquiesced to Beijing`s three long-standing demands: (1) termination of formal diplomatic relations with the ROC, (2) abrogation of the 1954 U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty, and (3) removal of all U.S. troops from Taiwan. At the same time, Washington "acknowledged" the PRC as the legitimate government of China.(2)
These moves were devastating blows to Taiwan. But Washington did agree to maintain "unofficial" or "substantive" relations with Taipei. Approximately fifty-five treaties, agreements, and programs with Taiwan were to remain in effect, and President Jimmy Carter declared that "the people of our country will maintain our current commercial, cultural, trade and other relations with Taiwan through non-governmental means."(3)
This highly unusual, multilevel arrangement required legitimization by Congress. Rejecting the Carter administration`s legislative proposals as too timid, the U.S. Congress passed the TRA by an overwhelming majority, and the act was subsequently signed into law by the president.
The TRA provides a legal framework for America`s continued commercial and cultural relations with Taiwan. It also outlines the terms of Washington`s unofficial governmental relations with Taipei. For example, the law stipulates that the functions of the U.S embassy would be taken over by the nongovernmental "American Institute in Taiwan (AIT)." The AIT would be staffed by U.S. government employees "on approved leave of absence."
Claiming that the TRA violates understandings that were reached to achieve normalization, the PRC condemns the act. Most contentious is Section 2(b)--the law`s provisions for the defense of Taiwan. In terms of America`s security commitment, the TRA states that it is the U.S. policy "to consider any attempt to resolve the Taiwan issue by other than peaceful means, including boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States." At the same time, the law clearly states that it is the U.S. government`s policy to provide Taiwan with such weapons as may be necessary for its security and an adequate defensive capability. The law further states that the quality and quantity of these weapons will be determined by the president and the Congress after consultation with U.S. military authorities.
In addition to the TRA, U.S. policy toward Taiwan is guided by three U.S. PRC Joint Communiques: the 1972 Shanghai Communique, the 1978 Normalization Communique, and the 17 August 1982 U.S.-China Joint Communique. In the 1972 Shanghai Communique--a document that helped pave the way for eventual normalization of U.S.-PRC relations--Washington and Beijing sought to sidestep the troublesome Taiwan issue. Both sides "agreed to disagree" over Taiwan. The PRC`s version of the communique calls for the "liberation" of Taiwan while the United States reaffirms "its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question."
In the 1978 Normalization Communique, which played a critical role in shaping America`s Taiwan policy, Washington acceded to Beijing`s three long-standing demands for normalization and "acknowledged" the PRC`s position that it is the legitimate government of China. Henceforth, U.S. relations with Taiwan would be conducted on a "private" or "unofficial" basis.
Perhaps most controversial is the 17 August 1982 U.S